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Abstract 14 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) involves trapping carbon dioxide (CO2) from power generation 15 
and heavy industrial processes and directing it into long-term geological storage (e.g. in depleted oil 16 
fields or saline aquifers). In doing so, CCS could facilitate global carbon abatement efforts. Yet, it 17 
remains controversial with high-profile public opposition to particular CCS developments. For 18 
instrumental, normative and substantive reasons, it is increasingly recognised that public acceptance of 19 
CCS as a vital precondition for its commercial-scale rollout. While much is known about factors 20 
influencing public support for CCS, relatively few cross-national studies have so far been undertaken. 21 
Here, we present findings from a large-scale international experimental study of public perceptions of 22 
CCS, to examine how individual, geographical and informational factors influence support for CCS. 23 
In particular, we compare the lens through which CCS is seen – as a ‘techno-fix’ climate change 24 
solution, as reusing a waste product (through Carbon Dioxide Utilisation [CDU]), or as part of a 25 
systemic approach to climate change mitigation. Pairing CCS with CDU led to higher support for 26 
CCS, although information frames interacted with national and individual-level factors. Depending on 27 
which CCS lens is chosen, different groups will be more or less likely to support CCS implementation. 28 
As with other issues, targeting CCS information to audience values is likely to be more effective than 29 
untargeted communication. Our findings also show mentioning (modest) costs of deploying CCS can 30 
lead to lower support. Discussing CCS costs should be done in the context of costs of broader energy 31 
system transformation and of not mitigating climate change so that the public can deliberate over the 32 
relative risks and benefits of CCS and alternatives in the context of broader sustainability pathways.33 
 3 
1 Introduction 34 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) involves trapping carbon dioxide (CO2) from power generation 35 
and heavy industrial processes and directing it into long-term geological storage (e.g. in depleted oil 36 
fields or saline aquifers). In doing so, CCS is seen as essential for facilitating global carbon abatement 37 
efforts (IPCC, 2014; IEA, 2013). Along with energy efficiency and certain other mitigation options, it 38 
is argued to be a cost-effective measure for reducing CO2 emissions that cause climate change 39 
(Praetorius & Schumacher, 2009). While CCS may offer environmental and economic benefits (van 40 
Egmond & Hekkert, 2012), it remains controversial with high-profile public opposition to particular 41 
CCS developments. It is increasingly recognised that public acceptance of CCS as a vital precondition 42 
for its commercial-scale rollout (RCUK, 2010; Wennersten et al., 2015). 43 
Public engagement with CCS is important for a range of reasons. From one point of view, it 44 
may serve to mitigate public opposition to developments – for example, those seen in Barendrecht in 45 
the Netherlands (Bellona, 2010). However, there are also reasons of democratic governance and 46 
decision quality that argue in favour of public views being considered in CCS decision-making. 47 
Fiorino (1990) distinguished three main rationales for public engagement: normative, substantive, and 48 
instrumental. That is, public engagement should involve those individuals who have a stake in the 49 
decision (e.g., communities affected by siting decisions; voters in the case of public funded projects); 50 
it can improve the quality of decision-making by drawing on diverse knowledge and values; or it may 51 
be used with a specific goal to raise public awareness, increase risk or product acceptance, or foster 52 
trust in experts, developers or government (Whitmarsh et al., 2009). A first step for engaging the 53 
public is to understand their perceptions. Here, we present findings from an international study of 54 
public perceptions of CCS, to examine how individual, geographical and informational factors 55 
influence support for CCS. 56 
1.1 Public perceptions of CCS 57 
Research on public perceptions of CCS highlights low public awareness of CCS across countries 58 
(Demski et al., 2013; Ashworth et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015), and various misperceptions (De Best-59 
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Waldhober et al., 2011; Poumadère et al., 2011). Views expressed are often ambivalent: concerns 60 
include the long-term viability of CCS, its safety, association with coal mining, and financial cost; 61 
while people are positive about the potential of CCS to reduce carbon emissions thereby helping 62 
combat climate change (Demski et al., 2013; Poumadère et al., 2011). Support for CCS is often 63 
contingent on CCS being not only safe but also just one part of a wider strategy for achieving cuts in 64 
CO2 emissions. However, there is much heterogeneity in CCS perceptions, with a range of factors 65 
influencing support. The key factors involved in community support for CCS include the 66 
characteristics of the project; the engagement process; risk perceptions; the actions of the stakeholders; 67 
the characteristics of the community, and the socio-political context (Poumadère et al., 2011).  68 
The majority of studies investigating perceptions of CCS have been conducted within 69 
individual countries; there have been notably fewer cross-cultural studies of CCS perceptions (and 70 
even fewer covering more than one continent), making direct comparisons across studies difficult  71 
From the cross-cultural studies that have been conducted in Europe, it seems that awareness is 72 
particularly high in the Netherlands (potentially due to the high profile nature of the Barendrecht case; 73 
Bellona, 2010), whereas elsewhere awareness is lower, with Europeans typically holding fairly mixed 74 
and ambivalent views towards CCS (Upham & Roberts, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2011; Reiner et al., 75 
2011). There are, however, notable differences between continents (L’Orange Seigo et al., 2014; 76 
Ashworth et al., 2013). For example, Canadians seem to be more accepting than Swiss publics, 77 
perhaps due to their different experience of (and dependence on) fossil fuel industries (L’Orange 78 
Seigo  et al., 2014). Even within individual countries, research points to regional variations in 79 
perceptions, with one German study finding those living closer to actual or proposed sites less 80 
supportive of CCS (Braun, 2017). 81 
Extending beyond simple geographical considerations, characteristics of the proposed scheme 82 
(e.g., feedstock, aspect of the capture or storage process being considered) have been found to interact 83 
with public opinion. One experimental Swiss study found local opposition to pipelines and storage, 84 
but this opposition disappeared when CO2 from a biogas-fired plant was used for the injection 85 
(Wallquist et al., 2012). Similarly, a survey of residents in Germany, Netherlands, UK, Poland and 86 
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Spain found local opposition to storage, but a more complex, quadratic relationship between local 87 
CCS project support and proximity to capture sites, with the most positive respondents those living 88 
closest (Eurobarometer, 2011). It is thus important to consider geographical and scheme-specific 89 
factors, as well as psychological factors, in understanding public support for CCS (Poumadère et al., 90 
2011).  91 
1.2 Framing effects and CDU 92 
In addition, the way in which CCS information is presented or ‘framed’ and audience 93 
characteristics (e.g., knowledge, values) also influence public views on the technology (van 94 
Knippenberg & Daamen, 1996; Brunsting et al., 2013; Broecks et al., 2016). Consequently, providing 95 
information about CCS does not always allay fears or change attitudes (Upham & Roberts, 2011; 96 
Brunsting et al., 2013; Wallquist et al., 2011; Braun et al., 2017). Consistent with the pervasive 97 
confirmation bias in information processing, whereby initial beliefs or feelings filter whether or how 98 
further information is perceived (De Bruin & Wong-Parodi, 2014), information may also exacerbate or 99 
confirm concerns or, conversely, reinforce positive attitudes. For example, Dutch and Scottish 100 
participants in one study became more negative after reading information about CCS, whereas 101 
Canadian and Australian participants became more positive (Ashworth et al., 2013). The notion of 102 
‘framing’ spans several social science disciplines and theories. Framing emphasises certain elements 103 
of a message and uses certain language or imagery to create particular associations or meanings; as 104 
such, framing provides ‘interpretive shortcuts’ to reduce complexity of information processing for 105 
audiences (Nisbet, 2009; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Critically, and consistent with persuasion 106 
theories (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), framing is most effective when it resonates with an audience’s 107 
prior understanding and values (Whitmarsh & Corner, 2017); for example, emphasising social or 108 
economic development benefits of environmental protection works better to persuade climate change 109 
sceptics to act pro-environmentally than focussing on climate change risks (Bain et al., 2012). 110 
Consistent with this, framing CCS as dealing with ‘waste’ seems to be more persuasive in 111 
encouraging support than framing it in terms of climate or economic benefits (Jones et al., 2017a). The 112 
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current study develops this finding to provide, for the first time, insights into representative public 113 
perceptions of carbon dioxide utilisation (CDU) – a technical process of recycling CO2 to make new 114 
products (e.g. cement and plastics) – on support for the technology (Jones et al., 2017b). We explore 115 
the dynamic between CCS as a sufficient climate change mitigation strategy versus the additional need 116 
for behaviour change, and the possible added value of CDU. Small-scale, deliberative research 117 
conducted in the UK and Germany suggests individuals express cautious support for CDU as a way of 118 
generating economic and possibly environmental benefits; while concerns include practical and 119 
technical issues as well as more fundamental, moral worries that CDU (like CCS; Demski et al., 2013) 120 
represents a techno-fix solution or ‘delaying tactic’ that might prevent the required societal change to 121 
tackle climate change (Jones et al., 2017a,b). These moral concerns are particularly evident amongst 122 
those with strong environmental values. Other work suggests ‘avoiding waste’ can be a powerful 123 
frame for persuading publics about environmental issues, even reducing climate change scepticism 124 
(Whitmarsh & Corner, 2017). Consistent with previous empirical and theoretical literatures (Corner et 125 
al., 2012; Chong & Druckman, 2007), we predicted that information framing would interact with 126 
individual characteristics, such as values and lifestyle. Specifically, we expected that those high in 127 
environmental values would express lower support for CCS and CDU, unless framed as part of a 128 
larger societal shift to address climate change. Conversely, we expected, consistent with the literature 129 
on identity threat and motivated reasoning (Corner et al., 2012), that those with more energy-intensive 130 
lifestyles (e.g., high income) would prefer CCS when framed as sufficient for mitigating climate 131 
change, meaning lifestyle change is not required. 132 
2 Methods 133 
To provide a detailed cross-national examination of public attitudes to CCS, that includes 134 
geographical, social, psychological and informational (frames, scheme characteristics) factors, we 135 
surveyed 5,406 members of the public in the UK, US, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands. These 136 
countries were selected because they reflect different stages of CCS development (including offshore 137 
and onshore storage), which were expected to influence perceptions (L’Orange Seigo et al., 2014). 138 
Due to findings of proximity effects noted above (Braun, 2017; Wallquist et al., 2012), we sampled 139 
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those living close to actual or proposed CCS sites, as well as a representative national sample, in each 140 
country. 141 
2.1 Measures & Materials  142 
Most measures used were taken or adapted from previous research (Whitmarsh et al., 2015). Items 143 
included questions of support for energy sources, attitudes to CCS, CCS risk and benefit perceptions, 144 
and a range of psychological constructs (e.g., place attachment, technophilia, environmental identity, 145 
environmental values) and demographic measures. The main measures used are described here: 146 
- CCS awareness: ‘How much would you say you know about ‘carbon capture and sequestration’ 147 
also known as ‘carbon capture and storage’ (or ‘CCS’)?’ with five response options from ‘Nothing 148 
– never heard of it’ to ‘A lot’ (see Figure 1). 149 
- Attitudes to CCS: ‘Carbon capture and sequestration (or carbon capture and storage – CCS) is the 150 
process of capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) – which contributes to climate change – from large 151 
installations such as fossil fuel power plants and heavy industries, and storing it safely 152 
underground. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements about Carbon Capture 153 
and Sequestration/ Storage (CCS)?’ with statements as shown in Figure 3 (items 3-9) and a 7-point 154 
response scale from Strongly disagree -3’ to ‘Strongly agree +3’ and an ‘I don’t know’ option 155 
(removed for analysis).  156 
- CCS risks versus benefits: ‘From what you know or have heard about CCS in this country, on 157 
balance, which of these statements most closely reflects your own opinion?’ with a 5-point response 158 
scale: ‘The benefits of CCS far outweigh the risks’ (2); ‘The benefits of CCS slightly outweigh the 159 
risks’ (1), ‘The benefits and risks of CCS are about the same’ (0), ‘The risks of CCS slightly 160 
outweigh the benefits’ (-1), and ‘The risks of CCS far outweigh the benefits’ (-2). ‘None of these’ 161 
and ‘don’t know’ were excluded from analysis. ‘Total agreement’ in the figure combines +1, +2, 162 
(and +3); ‘Total disagreement’ combines -1, -2, (and -3). 163 
- CCS support: ‘Should CCS be implemented in [name of country]? With a 5-point response scale 164 
from ‘Yes, definitely 2’ to ‘Definitely not -2’ and ‘I don’t know’ (removed for analysis) 165 
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- Support for energy sources and climate change mitigation options: 166 
‘How supportive or unsupportive are you of the following ways of generating power or reducing 167 
carbon emissions?’ on a 7-point response scale from ‘Very supportive +3’ to ‘Very unsupportive -168 
3’. A further response option, ‘Not aware of this option’, was removed for analysis. (For CCS, for 169 
example, this amounted to 35.5% of the sample).  170 
- Support for CCS with cost information: ‘Implementing CCS comes at a cost – currently 171 
estimated at £6-£12 [or converted to local currencies] on the average household electricity bill 172 
per year. But if we do not implement CCS in this country now, energy bills could rise even more 173 
in the future (because more CO2 mitigation measures would be necessary). How willing would 174 
you be to accept immediate implementation of CCS if this increase in bills was avoided?’ with 175 
a 5-point response scale: ‘Completely willing 4’ to ‘Not at all willing 0’. This was rescaled -2 176 
to +2 in order to compare with the CCS support question (Figure 5). 177 
- Environmental values: a short form of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale was used 178 
comprising six statements: ‘Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit 179 
their needs’, ‘Humans are seriously abusing the environment’, ‘Plants and animals have as much 180 
right as humans to exist’, ‘The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of 181 
modern industrial nations’, ‘Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature’ and ‘The balance 182 
of nature is very delicate and easily upset’ on a five-point agreement scale from -2 (strongly 183 
disagree) to +2 (strongly agree); (α(6)= .76). 184 
- Place attachment: four items were used: ‘I feel like I belong to the community where I live’, ‘I 185 
am very attached to the natural environment in my area’, ‘If I need advice about something I 186 
could go to someone in my neighbourhood’ and ‘Given the opportunity, I would like to move 187 
out of this neighbourhood’ (reverse scored), on a five-point agreement scale from -2 (strongly 188 
disagree) to +2 (strongly agree); (α(4)= .62). 189 
- Climate change scepticism: assessed with six items: ‘Claims that human activities are changing 190 
the climate are exaggerated’, ‘Climate change is just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s 191 
temperatures’, ‘There is too much conflicting evidence about climate change to know whether 192 
it is actually happening’, ‘It is too early to say whether climate change is really a problem’, ‘Too 193 
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much fuss is made about climate change’ and ‘I am convinced that climate change is really 194 
happening’ (reverse scored); (α(6)= .91). 195 
- Environmental identity: assessed with two items: ‘I think of myself as someone who is concerned 196 
about the environment’ and ‘Being environmentally-friendly is an important part of who I am’ on 197 
a five-point agreement scale from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree); (α(2)= .84) 198 
- Technophilia: assessed with a ten-item scale: ‘Technology is my friend’, ‘I enjoy learning new 199 
computer programs / apps and hearing about new technologies’, ‘People expect me to know about 200 
technology and I don’t want to let them down’, ‘If I am given an assignment that requires that I 201 
learn to use a new programme or how to use a machine, I usually succeed’, ‘I relate well to 202 
technology and machines’, ‘I am comfortable learning new technology’, ‘I know how to deal with 203 
technological malfunctions or problems’, ‘Solving a technological problem seems like a fun 204 
challenge’, ‘I find most technology easy to learn’, and ‘I feel as up-to-date on technology as my 205 
peers’ on a five-point agreement scale from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree); (α(10)= 206 
.94). 207 
- Demographics: gender, age, income, education, political ideology, and experience working in the 208 
energy industry were elicited in each country (see Table 1) as these have been shown to be relevant 209 
for CCS support (Poumadère et al., 2011). 210 
Table 1: Demographic details of sample (% in each country) 211 
 Canada US UK NL Norway TOTAL 
Gender       
Male 47.9% 48.8% 50.8% 50.4% 48.3% 49.3% 
Female 51.0% 50.5% 48.8% 48.8% 50.6% 49.9% 
Other / prefer not to say 1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.8% 1.1% 0.7% 
       
Age       
18-24 8.9% 12.2% 12.1% 10.5% 19.7% 12.4% 
25-34 17.5% 19.4% 16.3% 15.6% 19.0% 17.5% 
35-44 17.3% 18.4% 16.8% 18.7% 20.0% 18.2% 
45-54 20.4% 18.0% 17.3% 18.9% 18.9% 18.7% 
55-64 18.6% 15.4% 15.9% 17.3% 12.9% 16.1% 
65+ 17.2% 16.5% 21.3% 18.8% 9.2% 16.9% 
Other / prefer not to say 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
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Income       
$5,000-$14,999 7.4% 8.5% 5.8% 4.6% 5.0% 6.3% 
$15,000-$29,999 16.3% 15.7% 12.2% 12.0% 9.2% 13.2% 
$30,000-$49,999 17.5% 17.9% 19.2% 18.2% 11.1% 17.0% 
$50,000-$74,999 16.9% 17.4% 13.1% 13.5% 12.6% 14.8% 
$75,000-$99,999 13.7% 13.9% 23.5% 11.0% 12.7% 15.1% 
$100,000-$149,999 14.7% 13.4% 13.1% 19.6% 20.2% 16.0% 
$150,000-$199,999 7.5% 6.8% 8.8% 12.5% 18.3% 10.5% 
More than $200,000 6.0% 6.3% 4.4% 8.6% 10.9% 7.1% 
       
Education       
No formal qualifications 1.3% 5.3% 2.0% 0.5% 0.2% 1.9% 
Primary school leaving certificate 3.0% 4.0% 0.5% 0.7% 3.5% 2.3% 
Secondary school leaving certificate 20.1% 15.3% 22.1% 37.2% 27.8% 24.4% 
Post-secondary school certificate 
(not university) 
34.9% 14.5% 29.2% 37.9% 13.8% 26.5% 
University undergraduate degree 29.6% 40.1% 33.0% 8.9% 34.8% 29.1% 
University postgraduate degree 11.2% 20.8% 13.2% 14.7% 19.8% 15.8% 
       
Do you work, or have you ever worked, in the energy industry (i.e., companies involved in producing or 
selling gas, oil, coal, solar, etc.)? 
Yes, currently 4.5% 4.7% 3.9% 2.6% 3.7% 3.9% 
Yes, in the past 8.8% 7.8% 6.4% 5.2% 7.1% 7.1% 
No 86.7% 87.6% 89.7% 92.2% 89.2% 89.1% 
       
In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using the scale below, where would you place 
yourself on the political spectrum? (Left = 1… Right = 10). 
Mean: 5.01 5.26 5.19 5.37 5.43 5.25 
       
Experimental materials were developed in consultation with CCS experts and the literature. 212 
Following a description of CCS, three different experimental texts were presented according to 213 
condition: 214 
CCS description (all conditions): Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is the process of capturing 215 
carbon dioxide (CO2) from large installations such as fossil fuel power plants and heavy 216 
industries. Such installations emit CO2 as a wasteful by-product of power generation and 217 
manufacturing (e.g. steel, cement). Captured CO2 is then transported and stored safely so that it 218 
does not escape into the atmosphere, where it contributes to climate change. The CO2 may be 219 
stored underground as a gas, or chemically changed from a gas to a solid. Global carbon 220 
emissions amount to over 9 billion tonnes per year. Of this, over 33 million tonnes per year is 221 
currently captured by CCS. 222 
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CCS_BAU condition: CCS prevents the release of large quantities of CO2 into the atmosphere. 223 
This allows us to reduce the amount of atmospheric CO2 without having to change our way of 224 
life. For example, we will not have to fly less or use less energy at home!   225 
CCS+CDU condition: CCS prevents the release of large quantities of CO2 into the atmosphere. 226 
This allows us to reduce the amount of atmospheric CO2 without having to change our way of 227 
life. For example, we will not have to fly less or use less energy at home! CCS also allows the 228 
captured CO2 to be re-used to make useful carbon-based products. These include medicines, 229 
plastics, building materials (e.g. cement) and many other things. Re-using CO2 in this way helps 230 
reduce the waste our society produces.   231 
CCS+LC condition: CCS prevents the release of large quantities of CO2 into the atmosphere. 232 
This will add to other, necessary changes to our society and lifestyle – for example, flying less 233 
or using less energy at home. Together, these actions will help slow down climate change. 234 
2.2 Participants 235 
Participants (total N=5,406) were recruited via Qualtrics, an online participant panel provider, between 236 
July and October 2017. Participants were rewarded for their participation (with, e.g., shopping 237 
vouchers).  238 
Our survey was conducted in the UK, US, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, thus 239 
extending the geographic reach of previous research (mostly single country or within Europe) and 240 
allowing for cross-cultural comparison. These countries were selected because (a) they reflect 241 
different stages of CCS development (including offshore and onshore storage), which were expected 242 
to influence perceptions (L’Orange Seigo et al., 2014); and (b) because they had sufficient national 243 
and local sample representation in online participant panels (recruited via Qualtrics). Within Europe, 244 
countries with CCS activities (and associated public debate) include the Netherlands, Germany, 245 
France, Spain, Norway and Poland. A combination of how established CCS was in each country, the 246 
extent and nature of public debate about CCS, sample availability, and survey costs eventually 247 
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narrowed our European selection to the UK, Norway and the Netherlands (see Table 2). Given that 248 
there is evidence of existing differences in CCS perceptions across continents (L’Orange Seigo et al., 249 
2014; Ashworth et al., 2013), we also wanted to compare our European sub-sample with respondents 250 
from a different continent. North America (specifically Canada and the US) was selected given the 251 
extent of existing CCS activity there (see Table 2). Selecting Canada and the US for inclusion in the 252 
study also enabled a comparison of CCS perceptions within a set of five Western democracies and 253 
provided best balance of cultural comparability and diversity for the available study resources. 254 
Table 2. CCS project details in sampled countries (adapted from Global CCS Institute, 2018) 255 
Country CCS project and location   Storage location Project status and capture 
capacity*  
UK  Peterhead project, Scotland Offshore Scheme cancelled 2015 pre-
operations, 1 Mpta 
Norway  Sleipner project, Stavanger  Offshore Launched 1996, 1 Mtpa 
Netherlands  ROAD project, Rotterdam 
city  
Offshore Launched 2015 (demonstration), 
1.1 Mtpa 
US  Petra Nova project, Texas Onshore Launched 2017, 1.4 Mtpa 
Canada  Quest project, Alberta Onshore Launched 2015, 1 Mtpa 
*Mtpa = Million tonnes of CO2 per annum 256 
Two samples in each country (UK, US, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands) – a national sample 257 
and a local sample – were recruited as shown in Table 3. The national sample was demographically 258 
representative (according to latest census data) of each of the five countries in terms of gender and 259 
age. The local samples were identified as living close to a current or proposed CCS site (including 260 
processing, pipeline and storage locations). Proximity to the CCS site had to be balanced with 261 
inhabited and sufficiently populous areas, in order to ensure sufficient samples were recruited (with 262 
the aim of achieving N=100 for each site), so there is some variation in the radius around each site. 263 
Table 3. Sample details 264 
Country (total N) National sample CCS site & local sample 
UK  
(N=1,148) 
N=1,053 Peterhead project: 
Peterhead (NE Scotland) + 50km zone (N=95) 
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US  
(N=1,112) 
N=1,007 Petra Nova project 
Rosenberg (Houston, Texas) + 30km zone (N=105) 
Canada 
(N=1,110) 
N=1.010 Quest project 
Fort Saskatchewan, (Edmonton, Alberta) +20km zone 
(N=100) 
Norway  
(N=927) 
N=850 Sleipner project  
Stavanger region  (N=77) 
Netherlands 
(N=1,109) 
N=1,009 ROAD project  
Rotterdam city (N=100) 
2.3 Design & Procedure 265 
All participants gave informed consent, completed screening questions (to ensure regional and 266 
demographic quotas were met) and were then presented with questions about energy/mitigation 267 
options, CCS attitudes, and risk/benefit perceptions. They were then randomised to one of three 268 
information conditions: 269 
 CCS without lifestyle change (CCS_BAU) (N=1,424) 270 
 CCS with CDU (CCS+CDU) (N=1,397) 271 
 CCS with lifestyle change (CCS+LC) (N=1,384) 272 
After reading the information, participants completed manipulation checks (to assess whether they 273 
had properly read the information provided; see Table 4), and then completed dependent and 274 
independent variables, before being debriefed. 275 
Table 4. Results of manipulation checks for each condition 276 
 
CCS_BAU CCS+CDU CCS+LC 
CCS allows us to reduce the amount of atmospheric CO2 
without having to change our way of life. 
75.5%   
CCS allows the captured carbon dioxide (CO2) to be re-used 
to make useful carbon-based products. 
11.8% 83.1% 18.2% 
CCS and other societal changes will help slow down climate 
change 
11.8%  76.3% 
CCS is an essential part of cement manufacturing. 0.9% 3.9% 0.7% 
CCS contributes to the sustainability of marine environments 6.0%  
CCS converts carbon dioxide (CO2) to a liquid which is used 
in steel manufacturing 
5.4% 3.6% 
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Note: Respondents were asked: “Which of the following is an advantage of CCS mentioned in the text you just read?” 277 
Each condition included four response options, of which only one was correct. Correct answer is shown in bold.  278 
 279 
3 Results 280 
3.1 Individual and national differences in CCS support 281 
Findings showed that, consistent with previous research (Demski et al., 2013), public 282 
awareness of CCS is low (Figure 1), although there are cross-national differences in awareness, with 283 
the Norway sample showing the highest levels and the US sample the lowest.  Despite more awareness 284 
in Norway, the greatest support for CCS is evident in the UK (Figure 2). Lowest support is found in 285 
the Netherlands. Local samples (i.e., close to current or potential CCS sites) are more supportive of 286 
CCS being implemented than national samples, particularly in the UK. Analysis of variance 287 
(ANOVA) to examine the effects of nation and locality on CCS support (pre-information) indicates 288 
both main effects and interaction effects (shown in Figure 1). All countries significantly differ from 289 
one another, except the UK and Norway, at p<.01; F(4,3665)=19.06, p<.001; η2=.02). Local samples 290 
are significantly more supportive of CCS being implemented than are national samples; 291 
F(1,3665)=28.85, p<.001; η2=.008). 292 
Attitudes to CCS are ambivalent though moderately positive (Figure 3). More of the public 293 
agree that CCS should be implemented in their country than disagree. Most express concern about 294 
leaks from CCS and that it will encourage dependence on fossil fuels, while most also believe CCS 295 
could help mitigate climate change and help the economy. Comparison of responses to the post-296 
information CCS support question (M=0.45; SD=1.26) and the cost-framed support question (M=0.39; 297 
SD=1.30) , asked immediately afterwards, show these differ significantly: t(4,209) = 4.13, p<.001); 298 
see Figure 3. 299 
Comparing predictors of CCS support, we find nationality to be the strongest predictor; other 300 
predictors include proximity, place attachment, being younger, being male, right-wing political 301 
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ideology, climate change belief, technophilia, stronger environmental identity but lower environmental 302 
values, as well as working in the energy industry (Table 5). 303 
Table 5. Regression analysis of CCS support (pre-information) 304 
 305 
CCS Support (Pre-Info) 
 Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  4.68 0.00 
USA 0.02 0.86 0.39 
UK 0.10 5.11 0.00 
NL -0.09 -4.55 0.00 
Norway 0.09 4.26 0.00 
Local 0.09 5.71 0.00 
(Constant)  0.28 0.78 
USA 0.00 0.00 1.00 
UK 0.11 5.48 0.00 
NL -0.08 -3.83 0.00 
Norway 0.10 4.80 0.00 
Local 0.08 5.10 0.00 
Climate scepticism -0.08 -3.94 0.00 
Technophilia 0.13 8.11 0.00 
Environmental Identity 0.12 6.44 0.00 
NEP (Env. values) -0.12 -5.84 0.00 
(Constant)  -1.66 0.10 
USA 0.00 0.09 0.93 
UK 0.11 5.56 0.00 
NL -0.09 -4.36 0.00 
Norway 0.08 3.77 0.00 
Local 0.06 3.82 0.00 
Climate scepticism -0.10 -4.87 0.00 
Technophilia 0.10 5.71 0.00 
Environmental Identity 0.11 5.48 0.00 
NEP (Env. values) -0.10 -4.50 0.00 
Age -0.06 -3.40 0.00 
Gender (male) 0.06 3.44 0.00 
Household income 0.03 1.46 0.14 
Education -0.01 -0.63 0.53 
Political ideology 0.06 3.42 0.00 
Work(ed) in energy industry 0.09 5.12 0.00 
Place attachment 0.05 2.74 0.01 
 306 
Note. Significant predictors are shown in bold  307 
 308 
Model 1 R2 = .040*; Model 2 R2 = .081*; Model 3 R2= .099* (* ΔR2 p<.001) 309 
 310 
3.2 Framing effects on CCS support 311 
While CCS attitudes are moderately positive, renewables and energy demand reduction see 312 
higher levels of support (Figure 4). However, when CCS is paired with different energy sources or 313 
processes, support for it differs compared to CCS in general: bioenergy with CCS is more supported; 314 
while shale gas, underground coal gasification and heavy industry with CCS are less supported.  315 
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Information provision also influences CCS attitudes. Compared to support for CCS 316 
implementation before costs are mentioned, support is lower when CCS costs per household is 317 
mentioned (Figure 5). Similarly, when participants are exposed to the experimental component of the 318 
survey (information about CCS framed as either (a) business as usual [BAU], (b) with carbon dioxide 319 
utilisation [CDU], or (c) with lifestyle change), we find the CDU-framed information leads to greater 320 
support for CCS implementation than either of the other two information frames (Figure 6). ANOVA 321 
to examine information frame effects on CCS support shows the CDU condition elicits significantly 322 
higher support (M=.530, SD=1.25) than the BAU (M=.383, SD=1.28) or CCS+ frame (M=.439, 323 
SD=1.26), as shown in Figure 4; F(2,4209)=4.92, p=.007; η2=.002). Post-hoc Bonferroni analysis 324 
indicates the differences between CDU frame and BAU frame are significant (p=.006); but differences 325 
between other frames are not.  326 
Analysis of change in CCS support (post-information minus pre-information support) in each 327 
condition (Table 6) shows the different messages affect different types of people. Norwegians express 328 
significantly higher support for CCS in a BAU scenario; while those with strong environmental values 329 
express significantly lower support. Climate sceptics and those with no/few children expressed more 330 
support for CCS when CDU-framed. Men, older people, and those with high incomes showed lower 331 
support for CCS after reading the CCS + lifestyle change message.  332 
Table 6. Regression analysis of change in CCS support (post-information), by information frame 333 
 334 
 Change in CCS support (DV) CCS_BAU   CCS+CDU   CCS+LC 
Model Beta t Sig.  Beta t Sig.  Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant)  -1.34 0.18    0.29 0.77    -0.32 0.75 
 USA -0.01 -0.16 0.88  0.00 0.02 0.98  0.03 0.65 0.52 
 UK 0.06 1.52 0.13  -0.01 -0.34 0.73  -0.02 -0.52 0.60 
 NL 0.00 0.09 0.93  0.01 0.26 0.79  0.01 0.35 0.73 
 Norway 0.15 4.01 0.00  0.05 1.35 0.18  0.05 1.24 0.21 
 Local 0.00 -0.06 0.96  0.01 0.31 0.76  -0.01 -0.15 0.88 
2 (Constant)  0.15 0.88    1.68 0.09    -0.41 0.69 
 USA -0.02 -0.47 0.64  0.00 -0.05 0.96  0.02 0.62 0.54 
 UK 0.06 1.47 0.14  -0.02 -0.57 0.57  -0.02 -0.46 0.65 
 NL 0.01 0.12 0.90  0.01 0.22 0.82  0.02 0.43 0.67 
 Norway 0.16 4.08 0.00  0.05 1.38 0.17  0.05 1.16 0.25 
 Local -0.01 -0.18 0.86  0.01 0.21 0.84  -0.01 -0.33 0.74 
 Climate scepticism 0.01 0.36 0.72  0.16 4.33 0.00  0.06 1.68 0.09 
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 Technophilia 0.00 0.03 0.97  -0.03 -0.96 0.34  0.03 0.94 0.35 
 Environmental Identity 0.00 0.07 0.94  -0.01 -0.14 0.89  0.00 0.09 0.93 
  NEP (Env. values) -0.08 -2.01 0.04   0.02 0.47 0.64   0.02 0.45 0.65 
3 (Constant)  -0.33 0.75   0.41 0.68   3.43 0.00 
 USA -0.02 -0.58 0.56  -0.01 -0.12 0.91  0.01 0.20 0.84 
 UK 0.06 1.52 0.13  -0.02 -0.49 0.62  -0.01 -0.34 0.74 
 NL 0.01 0.34 0.74  0.01 0.32 0.75  0.02 0.38 0.71 
 Norway 0.16 3.93 0.00  0.06 1.56 0.12  0.04 1.08 0.28 
 Local -0.01 -0.32 0.75  0.01 0.36 0.72  -0.01 -0.35 0.73 
 Climate scepticism 0.02 0.48 0.63  0.14 3.50 0.00  0.05 1.37 0.17 
 Technophilia -0.01 -0.14 0.89  -0.01 -0.31 0.75  0.03 0.78 0.44 
 Environmental Identity 0.02 0.41 0.68  0.00 0.08 0.93  0.01 0.23 0.82 
 NEP (Env. values) -0.07 -1.83 0.07  0.01 0.13 0.90  -0.01 -0.31 0.76 
 Age -0.04 -1.22 0.22  0.01 0.35 0.73  -0.11 -3.36 0.00 
 Gender (male) -0.04 -1.09 0.28  -0.05 -1.52 0.13  -0.07 -2.05 0.04 
 Household income -0.01 -0.39 0.70  -0.03 -0.92 0.36  -0.07 -2.11 0.04 
 Education 0.05 1.40 0.16  0.01 0.31 0.76  -0.06 -1.72 0.09 
 Political ideology 0.04 1.21 0.23  0.06 1.81 0.07  0.02 0.53 0.60 
 Work(ed) in energy industry 0.01 0.42 0.67  -0.03 -0.90 0.37  0.03 0.98 0.33 
  Place attachment -0.01 -0.25 0.80   -0.03 -0.76 0.45   0.01 0.29 0.77 
 335 
Note. Significant predictors are shown in bold 336 
 337 
CCS_BAU Model 1 R2 = .022*; Model 2 R2 = .029; Model 3 R2= .035 (*ΔR2 p<.001) 338 
CCS+CDU Model 1 R2 = .003; Model 2 R2 = .027*; Model 3 R2= .034 (*ΔR2 p<.001) 339 
CCS+LC Model 1 R2 = .003; Model 2 R2 = .007*; Model 3 R2= .035* (*ΔR2 p<.001) 340 
 341 
4 Discussion 342 
CCS is argued to be a key element of efforts to tackle climate change, but it remains a 343 
controversial technology amongst the general public in many countries. Our results provide important 344 
and novel insights into public attitudes to CCS, highlighting the importance of geographical, 345 
psychological and informational factors in shaping support for CCS implementation. First, our 346 
findings expose strong cross-national differences in awareness and support for CCS, with Norway 347 
most aware and the UK most positive. Previous European cross-national research (conducted in 2011) 348 
found highest levels of awareness in the Netherlands, but did not include Norway in their sample 349 
(Eurobarometer, 2011; Reiner et al., 2011). Also, the six year time gap between the two studies and 350 
different sampling methodologies (random probability sampling in Eurobarometer versus our use of 351 
online panels) could explain the somewhat lower levels of awareness in the Netherlands we observed. 352 
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We found lowest support for CCS in the Netherlands, likely at least in part due to its history of 353 
opposition to proposed CCS development (i.e., Barendrecht; De Best-Waldhober et al., 2011). Indeed, 354 
country of residence is the strongest predictor of CCS support, highlighting the importance of cross-355 
cultural research in this area. Proximity to proposed or current CCS facilities was also important, with 356 
proximal samples (i.e., close to current or potential CCS sites), particularly in the UK, more 357 
supportive of CCS than the general national samples – perhaps because of their history and 358 
dependence on energy industry for employment and greater familiarity with the technology (L’Orange 359 
Seigo et al., 2014). This finding that proximal communities were more supportive of CCS than general 360 
public samples is partly consistent with prior research in this area. Such research has observed a 361 
degree of ‘YIMBYism’ (Yes In My Backyard) around proposed carbon capture facilities, with local 362 
objection tending to be more likely around proposed storage sites (Braun, 2017; Eurobarometer, 363 
2011). Within our research, our selection of ‘local’ samples was determined by proximity to current or 364 
proposed CCS sites, including processing, pipeline and/or storage locations. It is possible that using 365 
this definition we inadvertently sampled a greater number of people living adjacent to capture versus 366 
storage sites. If so, this could help to account for overall positive proximity (i.e. YIMBY) effect 367 
observed in our sample. More generally, though, the research on local support and opposition to new 368 
infrastructure calls into question assumptions that local development is always opposed by those living 369 
closest to it (so-called ‘NIMBYism’; Not In My Backyard); rather, opposition depends on how the 370 
particular development is conceived of in relation to residents’ attachment to and understanding of 371 
(e.g., as ‘industrial’, ‘natural’) the local area (Devine-Wright, 2009, 2011). Where communities are 372 
supportive of a proposed development (YIMBY), this tends to be where there is identification with 373 
and/or (anticipated) reliance upon the proposed infrastructure (Warren et al., 2005; Eiser et al., 1995). 374 
Consistent with this, communities hosting CCS projects would stand to benefit economically from the 375 
jobs and revenue the industry would provide. Further, the areas in which CCS facilities are likely to be 376 
built are typically sites where there is existing (analogous) industry. Subjective familiarity with such 377 
industry could serve to reduce the perceived risks associated with new infrastructure, thus yielding a 378 
greater acceptance (or tolerance) of CCS within earmarked ‘host’ communities.  379 
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Second, we find framing affects CCS support in several ways. Consistent with previous work 380 
(Wallquist et al., 2012), pairing CCS with bioenergy (i.e. ‘BECCS’) leads to more support; while we 381 
also find fossil fuel and industry pairings see CCS less supported, suggesting BECCS is likely to be 382 
more widely accepted than most current (fossil) CCS schemes. Given the importance of BECCS to 383 
many climate change mitigation scenarios (IPCC, 2014), this is encouraging. In addition, compared to 384 
support for CCS implementation before costs are mentioned, support reduces when CCS costs per 385 
household were mentioned (despite these being very modest – $/£6-12 per year – and the focus of the 386 
information being on future greater costs being avoided through CCS implementation now). This 387 
highlights a need for caution when discussing costs; if the public have no expectation that CCS will 388 
have cost implications for households, then even stressing the lower costs of CCS than alternative 389 
mitigation options may backfire and reduce support.  390 
Similarly, when participants are exposed to the experimental component of the survey 391 
(information about CCS framed as either ‘business as usual’, with CDU, or with lifestyle change), we 392 
find the CDU-framed information leads to greater support for CCS implementation than either of the 393 
other two frames. Describing how CO2 might be recycled to make new products (i.e., via CDU) may 394 
help persuade publics of the benefits of CCS (Jones et al., 2017a,b). Frame preference varies as a 395 
function of national and individual factors, however. Perhaps because of their extant support for and 396 
reliance on CCS, Norwegians are significantly more likely to support CCS in a BAU scenario. 397 
Conversely, those with stronger environmental values significantly reduce support for CCS in a BAU 398 
scenario, suggesting a preference for more significant change to address climate change. Interestingly, 399 
and consistent with previous research on climate change framing (Whitmarsh & Corner, 2017), CDU 400 
information apparently increases CCS support amongst climate sceptics. This is intriguing and may 401 
suggest waste framings serve to reduce identity threat associated with climate change belief (Kahan et 402 
al., 2011); or simply that highlighting CCS’ utility beyond climate mitigation raises support amongst 403 
those who do not believe in climate change. Among those who showed decreased support for CCS in 404 
the CCS with lifestyle change framing were those on high incomes, perhaps because of the implied 405 
threat to energy-intensive lifestyles (which is associated with higher incomes). This is consistent with 406 
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previous research on framing, motivated reasoning and identity threat, and reinforces the need to find 407 
more value-consistent messaging to communicate climate change and associated mitigation options 408 
(Bain et al., 2012; Chong & Druckman, 2007).   409 
5 Conclusions & Implications  410 
Overall, our results show attitudes to CCS vary widely across countries, regions and 411 
individuals; and that different frames influence CCS support. Critically, CCS may be seen through 412 
different lenses: as a ‘techno-fix’ (business as usual) solution to climate change, as a means of 413 
avoiding waste and supporting a more circular economy (CDU), or as part of a systemic package of 414 
climate change mitigation options that includes lifestyle change. Depending on which of these lenses 415 
is chosen, different groups will be more or less likely to support CCS implementation in their country.  416 
For those interested in promoting public engagement with CCS, our findings have important 417 
implications.  First, it should not be assumed that those who live closest to CCS developments will 418 
necessarily oppose them; indeed, depending on their local history (e.g. relationships to and familiarity 419 
with heavy industry, place identity, etc.) and their subjective understandings of the costs, risks and 420 
benefits of the technology, they may even be more favourable. However, neither local opposition nor 421 
local support should be assumed a priori; rather a process of deliberative engagement with 422 
communities is important for exploring local perceptions, addressing concerns, managing risks and 423 
distributing benefits (Devine-Wright, 2011). As noted at the outset, amongst the rationales for public 424 
engagement, involving publics and communities in decision-making about CCS developments can 425 
improve decision quality as well as potentially mitigating opposition (Fiorino, 1990). 426 
Second, as noted, framing is a potentially powerful tool for shaping audience perceptions 427 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). This is likely to be the case particularly for issues like CCS and CDU 428 
where attitudes are not yet developed (due to low awareness) or are ambivalent, and therefore more 429 
malleable in the presence of new information (Jones et al., 2017a; Whitmarsh et al., 2015). As with 430 
other issues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), targeting CCS information to audience values and situations is 431 
likely to be more effective than untargeted communication. Our results highlight in particular the 432 
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benefits for CCS communication of affiliating the technology with CDU. This has been suggested in 433 
prior work (Jones et al., 2017a), and would appear to be particularly relevant to contexts where CCS is 434 
not outright rejected as a technology option (like in the UK). Previous research shows costs are a 435 
stumbling block to public support for CCS (Ashworth et al., 2015). Our findings demonstrate that 436 
even indicating these costs are modest can backfire and reduce support. On the basis of the current 437 
study, we feel that discussing the costs of CCS should be done in the context of the cost of broader 438 
energy system transformation (or of not mitigating climate change) so that the public can deliberate 439 
the relative risks and benefits of CCS in the context of broader sustainability pathways (Demski et al., 440 
2015). Such public debate and deliberation is critical in light of ethical concerns about negative 441 
emissions technologies, including CCS, and their role in desirable societal futures (Lenzi et al., 2018). 442 
Our experimental texts were designed to explore responses to CCS in relation to different frames; one 443 
of the frames posed CCS as an alternative to lifestyle change when in reality both will be required in 444 
order to limit global warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels (Lenzi et al., 2018). This 445 
arguably highlights a limitation of brief framing studies or simple, top-down information-based 446 
interventions in comparison to more participatory and deliberative approaches. Using more 447 
deliberative approaches can allow for the provision of more information and nuanced debate, allowing 448 
for greater reflection on the complexities surrounding target issues (Lovan et al., 2004). That said, to 449 
the extent that people will often rely on a small amount of information when forming their opinions of 450 
technological innovation (e.g. from engaging with brief news reports), our study could be seen to 451 
reflect how people might be expected respond to news about CCS in everyday settings (Upham et al., 452 
2015).  453 
Finally, our research suggests the importance of greater collaboration between the CCS and 454 
CDU research communities. Notwithstanding tensions between these communities, we show there 455 
could be value in the unification of the technologies from a public perception angle. More generally, 456 
our findings speak also to the need for greater collaboration between social scientists and the 457 
engineering community around the research, development and deployment of new technologies (Jones 458 
& Jones, 2016). We show here how social scientific theories (e.g., framing) can shed light on how 459 
 22 
information about emerging technologies like CCS and CDU are conveyed to a public audience and 460 
the implications this has for public support for their deployment in a number of countries. 461 
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Figure legends list 482 
Figure 1. Public awareness of CCS, by country. 483 
Note to Figure 1. Difference between countries in public awareness of CCS is significant: χ2 484 
(16, N=5406) = 398.60, p<.001) 485 
 486 
Figure 2. National and regional differences in support for CCS implementation (error bars: +/- SE) 487 
 488 
Figure 3. Public attitudes to CCS 489 
 490 
Figure 4. Public support for energy sources and climate change mitigation options, including CCS 491 
 492 
Figure 5. Effect of cost information on CCS support (error bars: +/- SE) 493 
 494 
Figure 6. Effect of different information frames on CCS support (error bars: +/- SE) 495 
Note to Figure 6. CCS-BAU was the ‘business as usual’ CCS frame, stating lifestyles would 496 
not need to change; CCS+CDU included a description of CDU through which waste CO2 497 
would be recycled to make new products; CCS+LC described CCS as part of a range of 498 
other changes, including lifestyle changes, to tackle climate change.  499 
 500 
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